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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING AND THE FUTURE OF
STATE IMMIGRATION LAWS

INTRODUCTION
The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”) requires
employers to verify the legal status of all newly hired employees.1 To
facilitate compliance with this requirement, the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) created a federal database (“Everify”) that employers could use as a means of verification, although the
IIRIRA provided that “the Attorney General may not require any person or
other entity to participate” in E-verify.2 In 2007, Arizona enacted legislation
that required employers to use E-verify to check the immigration status of all
new-hires.3 When a coalition of employers and immigrant-rights activists sued
in federal court to block the implementation of the new law, titled the Legal
Arizona Workers Act (“LAWA”), the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona ruled that the federal statutory language making E-verify voluntary
did not preempt Arizona from requiring the database’s use.4 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s decision.5
By contrast, subsequent decisions in the Third and Tenth Circuits
concluded that federal law preempted similar laws in Pennsylvania and
Oklahoma.6 These courts reached their conclusions partly on the grounds that
requiring the use of E-verify upsets the balance of interests that Congress
hoped to achieve by making E-verify’s use voluntary.7

1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 274A(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(b)(1)(A) (2006).
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, §§ 402(a), 403(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656, 3009-659 to -662. The IIRIRA provided for
several pilot programs. Id. One of them, called the Basic Pilot in the Act, became known as Everify. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1042 (D. Ariz. 2008).
3. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-214 (Supp. 2010).
4. Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 1057.
5. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 861 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub
nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
6. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 219 (3d Cir. 2010); Chamber of Commerce v.
Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 769 (10th Cir. 2010).
7. Lozano, 620 F.3d at 210–11; Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 767–68.
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On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Ninth
Circuit case under the caption Chamber of Commerce v. Candelaria.8 On
December 8, 2010, the Court heard arguments to determine whether the
voluntary nature of the federal law preempts the obligations imposed by the
Arizona law.9 On May 26, 2011, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
ruling.10
This Note will explain why, although the Ninth Circuit correctly applied
existing law in this case, the Supreme Court should have reversed existing
precedents and secured control of immigration law at the Federal level. Such
an outcome would have prevented further impractical immigration restrictions,
created a more uniform and predictable frame of reference for employers’
immigration questions, and enhanced compliance with the law.
I. HISTORY
A.

History of the IRCA & IIRIRA

The impetus for the IRCA stemmed from the enactment of the Immigration
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 (“INA”).11 Before 1965, strict
controls governed the number of persons allowed to enter the United States
from Europe and Asia, but few limitations applied to entry from the
Americas.12 This lack of limits allowed farmers in the western states to
organize “bracero”13 programs starting in 1917 to bring Latino farm workers
back and forth across the Mexican border as needed to work in the fields.14
The 1965 INA imposed a cap of 120,000 persons per annum on migration from
the Western Hemisphere15 and specified that only ten percent of visas given
each year should be apportioned to “immigrants who are capable of performing
specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for
which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists in the United
States.”16
The bracero programs terminated around the time of the INA’s enactment,
but the programs’ end did not change the fundamental supply-and-demand

8. 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), decided sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting 131 S. Ct.
1968, 1981 (2011).
9. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1968 (2011).
10. Id. at 1987.
11. See Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
12. HELENE HAYES, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE UNDOCUMENTED 16 (2001).
13. Bracero is Spanish for “one who works with his arms.” Id. at 18.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, sec. 3, § 203(a)(6), 79 Stat. at
913.
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considerations that motivated their initial formation.17 Consequently, large
numbers of workers who had once participated in the bracero programs began
to travel in and out of the United States in a covert, undocumented fashion.18
By 1980, officials estimated the number of undocumented Latino immigrants
to be somewhere between three and six million, even as the country suffered a
surge in unemployment during a difficult recession.19 Moreover, those
immigrants in the United States suffered stereotyping as “welfare cheats” and
“free-loaders,”20 sparking an increase in anti-immigrant sentiments that
culminated in Attorney General William French Smith’s 1981 declaration that
“[w]e have lost control of our borders.”21
To regain control, the IRCA attempted to turn off the “job magnet” that
drew migrants in the first place.22 Interest groups from both ends of the
political spectrum mounted a bipartisan effort to address the immigration
issue,23 joining groups as disparate as the Daughters of the American
Revolution and the American Civil Liberties Union to forge what has been
characterized as “a carefully crafted political compromise which at every level
balances specifically chosen measures discouraging illegal employment with
measures to protect those who might be adversely affected.”24 For instance,
while early drafts of the IRCA provided permanent residency to any
undocumented worker “who could prove that he had been working in
perishable agriculture for at least 20 full days” in 1985, the final version that
was actually passed required ninety days.25 Likewise, the Democraticcontrolled House included a provision in an early draft ending the employer
sanctions after six and one half years only to have the measure axed by
Republicans in the Senate.26
The earliest draft of the bill imposed a one thousand dollar fine per illegal
worker if the employer had at least four illegal workers on the payroll.27 When

17. HAYES, supra note 12, at 18.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 21. It should be noted that this popular perception was not well grounded in data.
Id. at 38.
21. Administration’s Proposals on Immigration and Refugee Policy: Joint Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int’l Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and
Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 6
(1982) (statement of William French Smith, Att’y Gen. of the United States).
22. HAYES, supra note 12, at 47.
23. Id. at 41–46.
24. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1366 (9th Cir. 1990); see
also Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 212 (3d Cir. 2010); Romano L. Mazzoli,
Immigration Reform: The Path to Passage and Beyond, 14 J. LEGIS. 41, 41 (1987).
25. HAYES, supra note 12, at 60.
26. Id. at 62.
27. Id. at 53.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

616

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:613

anti-immigration lobbying groups objected that these sanctions were too weak,
a subsequent draft of the bill called for three thousand dollar fines against
repeat offenders per illegal worker for even one illegal worker on the payroll.28
With business interests alarmed that xenophobia might cut into profits and
Hispanic organizations alarmed that employer sanctions would lead to
discrimination,29 Congress reached a compromise of two thousand dollars per
illegal worker for the first offense.30 No fewer than seven failed attempts to
reach an acceptable balance were required, as various interest groups
demanded adjustments to this or that provision, before the final IRCA was
achieved.31 The later IIRIRA required a similar series of congressional
compromises, illustrating the complex politics of immigration reform.32
B.

History of the LAWA

While the impetus behind the LAWA included the IRCA and the IIRIRA,
other demographic and financial trends unique to Arizona influenced the
debate. Although economists disagree about the fiscal impact of illegal
immigration on various levels of government,33 many think that illegal
immigration’s fiscal impact falls more heavily on border states like Arizona.34

28. See id. at 54, 55.
29. See id. at 56–64 (describing the differing reactions to the employer sanctions provisions
in the proposed legislation).
30. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 274A(e)(4),
100 Stat. 3359, 3366.
31. HAYES, supra note 12, at 53–55.
32. See, e.g., Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 710 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting the compromise
involved in the IIRIRA); LARRY EIG & WILLIAM KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97–946 A,
IMMIGRATION: ADJUSTMENT TO PERMANENT RESIDENCE STATUS UNDER SECTION 245(i) 5
(1998), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/487.pdf.
33. See, e.g., The Budgetary Impact of Current and Proposed Border Security and
Immigration Policies: Hearing on S. 2611 Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 7
(2006) (statement of Paul R. Cullinan, Chief, Human Resources Cost Estimates Unit of the
Congressional Budget Office) [hereinafter “Cullinan”] (“[W]hen increases in immigration are
simulated in the [Social Security Administration’s computer] models, the program’s finances
generally show improvement . . . .”); GORDON H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 23 (2007) (“[W]e cannot say with much
conviction whether the aggregate impact of immigration on the U.S. economy is positive or
negative. What available evidence does suggest is that the total impact is small.”); PANEL ON THE
DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 9 (James
P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997) (“[T]he net fiscal impact of all U.S. immigrant-headed
households . . . averaged across all native households in the United States . . . [is a burden] on the
order of $166 to $226 per native household.”).
34. See, e.g., Cullinan, supra note 33, at 4 (“CBO’s review of the research on immigration
found that over the long term, immigration tends to affect federal finances positively and state
and local finances negatively.”); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
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While this last point is not clearly established,35 popular perceptions that the
nation suffered from an excess of undocumented immigrants grew throughout
the 1990s, especially in the border states.36 Meanwhile the federal government
struck some commentators as being complicit in the entry of undocumented
immigrants, even though it retained the power to create and enforce
immigration laws.37 Such perceptions engendered anti-federal resentment in
Arizona.38
To counter popular outrage, Arizona legislators invited Professor Kris
Kobach to help draft legislation that became the LAWA.39 These legislators
were inspired by Professor Kobach’s writings on the subject of state
immigration laws.40 Just like the IRCA at the federal level, the LAWA sought
to reduce illegal immigration to Arizona by preventing undocumented workers
from obtaining jobs.41 As Governor Napolitano’s LAWA signing statement

PRESIDENT 106–07 (2005) (“[W]hile immigrants do not impose a net higher tax burden at the
Federal level, natives in states with a heavy concentration of immigrants from Latin America do
realize an increased overall tax burden.”).
35. See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUDIES IN PUB. POLICY, IMMIGRANTS IN
ARIZONA: FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 3 (2008) (“[I]mmigrants in Arizona generated a net
2004 fiscal contribution of about $940 million toward services such as public safety, libraries,
road maintenance, and other areas.”).
36. See, e.g., MORRISON INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: PERCEPTIONS
AND REALITIES (2010); Johanna Dunaway et al., Agenda Setting, Public Opinion, and the Issue of
Immigration Reform, 91 SOC. SCI. Q. 359, 359 (2010); Rita J. Simon & James P. Lynch, A
Comparative Assessment of Public Opinion Towards Immigrants and Immigration Policy, 33
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 455, 458–59 (1999).
37. See, e.g., Cullinan, supra note 33, at 8 (noting the large flow of illegal immigrants
despite increases in the number of border control agents); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra
note 34, at 93, 114 (suggesting that the federal government needs to do a better job enforcing
immigration laws and that the IRCA failed to stop illegal immigration, in part, due to the
burdensome nature of the labor certification checks).
38. See, e.g., MORRISON INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, supra note 36.
39. Alia Beard Rau, Activist’s Strategy Spurred Ariz. Law, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 31, 2010,
at A1.
40. Professor Kobach is known for scholarly writings encouraging states to take a more
active role in immigration enforcement and more particularly for his “mirror-image theory,”
which holds that states are broadly free to enact immigration-related laws so long as they mirror
exactly the wording of federal immigration laws. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule
of Law: What States Can and Should Do to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
459, 465 (2008) (suggesting that a state immigration law must use terms consistent with federal
law if it is to avoid preemption); see also Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The
Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 251,
255–56 (2011).
41. See, e.g., JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUDIES IN PUB. POLICY, ARIZONA’S
ECONOMY AND THE LEGAL ARIZONA WORKERS ACT 1 (2008).
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explained, federal foot-dragging left the state feeling obliged to secure its own
borders.42
Professor Kobach intentionally drafted the new law to survive a
preemption challenge. It deliberately defers to federal law on the question of
who is legally allowed to work in the United States.43 It obliges employers to
verify the legal work eligibility of all new hires using the federal E-verify
database.44 Finally, its enforcement sanctions are limited to the revocation of
business licenses45 so as to come within the scope of the IRCA’s own savings
clause, which explicitly “preempt[s] any State or local law imposing civil or
criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws).”46
C. Federal Preemption Jurisprudence
The leading modern case on the intersection of preemption and
immigration, De Canas v. Bica, involved American farm workers who sued
farm labor contractors under a California statute that provided a right of
recovery for those displaced by undocumented immigrant workers.47 The
California Superior Court dismissed the case, holding that the statute in
question was an unconstitutional intrusion on the federal power to regulate
immigration.48 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that when
a state enacts a regulation governing the employment of immigrants, it is an
employment law (an area within the states’ historic police powers)49 and not an
immigration law (an exclusively federal prerogative).50
At the time that De Canas was decided, Congress had yet to address the
employment of undocumented workers in anything more than a cursory
fashion.51 Consequently, the Court hinted that De Canas might have been
decided differently if Congress had addressed such matters more directly.52 Of
course, in the years since De Canas was decided, Congress has crafted
42. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Governor of Ariz., to Jim Weiers, Speaker of the Ariz.
House of Representatives (July 2, 2007) [hereinafter Napolitano Letter], available at
http://www.azsos.gov/public_services/Chapter_Laws/2007/48th_Legislature_1st_Regular_Ses
sion/CH_279.pdf.
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(11) (Supp. 2010).
44. Id. § 23-214.
45. Id. § 23-212(F)(1)(d), (F)(2).
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
47. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353 (1976).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 356–57.
50. Id. at 355–56. De Canas defines immigration law per se as “a determination of who
should or should not be admitted into the country.” Id. at 355.
51. Id. at 360.
52. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 361 n.9 (“Congress’ failure to enact such general sanctions
reinforces the inference that . . . Congress believes this problem does not yet require uniform
national rules . . . .”).
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legislation specifically regulating the employment of immigrants, namely, the
IRCA,53 so the remaining applicability of De Canas was unclear54 until the
Court recently reaffirmed De Canas’s presumption against preemption of state
laws regulating matters historically within the states’ police powers—such as
the employment of immigrants.55
The Court had clarified the law concerning explicit preemption in
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, which involved a plaintiff who sued a medical device
manufacturer for defective product design when her pacemaker failed.56 The
defendant manufacturer argued that the Florida common law liability
principles that the plaintiffs asserted were preempted by the federal Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”).57 The Supreme Court disagreed,
reaffirming that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touch-stone in every
preemption case. As a result, any understanding of the scope of a pre-emption
statute must rest primarily on a fair understanding of congressional purpose.”58
The Court reasoned that when a law touches on an area within the scope of
the states’ historic police powers, federal law does not supersede unless
Congress manifests a clear intention to do so.59 Because there was nothing in
either the statutory text of the MDA60 or its legislative history61 that rebutted
the presumption against preemption, the Court ruled that the Florida cause of
action was not preempted by the MDA.62
In contrast to the explicit federal preemption of state law described above,
state laws can also be implicitly preempted by either “field” or “conflict”
preemption.63 “Field preemption” occurs when Congress intends to occupy an
53. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (“IRCA forcefully
made combating the employment of illegal aliens central to the policy of immigration law.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
54. See Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 864–65 (9th Cir. 2009);
Hajra I. Malik, Raiding the American Workplace: Federal Preemption and States’ Rights in
Curbing Unlawful Alien Employment, 39 N.M. L. REV. 577, 580 (2009).
55. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1981 (2011).
56. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 481 (1996).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 485–86 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at 485 (“In all pre-emption cases . . . we start with the assumption that the historic
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (“[A]n ‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal presence.”).
60. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 487.
61. Id. at 490–91.
62. Id. at 494.
63. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (“[A] federal statute
implicitly overrides state law either when the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended
federal law to occupy a field exclusively, or when state law is in actual conflict with federal law.”
(citation omitted)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

620

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:613

area of law without explicitly claiming as much in any particular statute.64
“Conflict preemption” occurs when the requirements of federal and state laws
are such that an individual cannot comply completely with both.65 The law on
implicit preemption had also developed in the years since De Canas. In
particular, the Court has noted that “saving clauses” (like the one in the
IRCA)66 serve only to prevent explicit preemption, but do not save state
statutes from implicit preemption where either field or conflict preemption is
implicated.67
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT:
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA, INC. V. NAPOLITANO
A.

The IRCA Does Not Explicitly Preempt the LAWA

Governor Janet Napolitano signed the LAWA into law on July 2, 2007.68
On December 9, 2007, a coalition of Arizona business and immigrants’ rights
activists filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging
that the LAWA violated the plaintiff’s Due Process rights, violated the
Separation of Powers doctrine of the Arizona Constitution, and was preempted
by federal law.69 The district court ruled for the defendants and the same
coalition of business and immigration interest groups appealed.70
When confronted with a facial challenge to the LAWA, the Ninth Circuit’s
first task was to determine whether the LAWA was expressly preempted by the
IRCA’s preemption provisions.71 The IRCA excludes “licensing and similar
laws”72 from its preemption scope, so the argument on this point centered on
whether the LAWA fit within this exception.73 The appellants argued that the
savings clause should be read narrowly as applying only to particular
professional licenses (e.g., license to practice law), not business licenses;

64. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (“When Congress
intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’ state law in that area is preempted.”).
65. See id. (“[E]ven if Congress has not occupied the field, state law is naturally preempted
to the extent of any conflict with a federal statute. We will find preemption where it is impossible
for a private party to comply with both state and federal law . . . .” (citations omitted)).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
67. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000) (“[S]aving clause[s] [do]
not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”).
68. Napolitano Letter, supra note 42, at 1.
69. Complaint at 3, Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (No. CV07-02496-PHX-NVW).
70. Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2009).
71. “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or
refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
72. Id.
73. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864.
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otherwise, the exception could easily swallow the rule.74 The question,
therefore, became whether the exception should be read broadly (in which case
the LAWA would fit within the exception and be sustained) or narrowly (in
which case the LAWA would not fit within the exception and would be struck
down by the IRCA preemption provisions).75
1.

Under De Canas the LAWA Is an Employment Law

Does the LAWA regulate a matter within the states’ traditional police
powers or within the historic federal prerogatives? If the LAWA governs a
state matter, then per Medtronic, there would be a presumption against
preemption and the exception should be applied broadly.76 If the LAWA
governs a federal matter, however, then there would be no presumption77 and
the exception should be applied narrowly.78 The Ninth Circuit held that, under
De Canas, the LAWA is an employment law within the scope of the states’
police powers, so a presumption against preemption should apply and the
IRCA exception should be applied broadly.79
2.

De Canas Still Controls, Even in Light of the IRCA

At this point the court paused to address the argument that De Canas was
no longer applicable in light of the IRCA.80 The appellants, relying on
language in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,81 had argued that the
IRCA made the regulation of undocumented workers “central to the policy of
immigration law,” thus bringing the issue within a federal domain in which a
presumption against preemption no longer applied.82 The court, however,
distinguished Hoffman from the instant case on the grounds that Hoffman
involved a federal administrative agency rule, not a state law, so Hoffman did
not really speak to issues of preemption and De Canas still controlled.83
B.

The IIRIRA Does Not Conflict with the LAWA

Having established that the LAWA was not expressly preempted, the court
proceeded to conclude that the LAWA was not implicitly preempted under a

74. Id. at 865.
75. Id.
76. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 487 (1996).
77. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
78. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864.
79. Id. at 865.
80. Id. at 864–65.
81. 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
82. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 864 (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535
U.S. at 147) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 865.
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conflict preemption theory.84 The appellants had argued that requiring all
Arizona employers to use E-verify frustrated the congressional intent to keep
E-verify voluntary.85 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that Congress had repeatedly
expanded the availability of E-verify, suggesting that Congress wished to see
E-verify used more widely, so a state law requiring its use was not really in
conflict with congressional intent.86 Moreover, the court reasoned that because
Congress had explicitly preempted state laws “imposing civil or criminal
sanctions . . . upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens,”87 the fact that it
had not explicitly preempted laws requiring E-verify’s use should be
understood to imply that Congress had no objection to such laws.88
The appellants had also attempted to argue that the revocation of violators’
business licenses was a harsher penalty than the monetary fines imposed by the
IRCA, and that this increased sanction would encourage employers to avoid
hiring Hispanics for fear of losing a business license for inadvertently hiring an
undocumented worker.89 Such an outcome would frustrate the delicate balance
that Congress had intended to strike between immigration enforcement and
civil rights protections.90 The court rejected this argument as too speculative91
because a facial challenge to a law on conflict preemption grounds must rest on
an actual conflict92 and not veer off into speculations about hypothetical
outcomes.93 The court suggested that if such discriminatory employment

84. Id. at 866–67.
85. Id. at 866.
86. Id. at 867 (citing Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-156, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944; Basic Pilot Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115
Stat. 2407, 2407 (2002)). It is, perhaps, worth noting that the Lozano court takes this exact
argument and stands it on its head, arguing that “through various expansions of the program,
Congress has continually required that E-Verify be strictly voluntary for the vast majority of
employers.” Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, § 547, 123 Stat. 2142, 2177;
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-329, § 143, 122 Stat. 3574, 3580 (2008); Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-156, §§ 2, 3, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944; Basic Pilot Extension Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, § 2, 115 Stat. 2407, 2407 (2002)).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006).
88. Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 867.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (“The existence of a
hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.”).
93. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–50 (2008)
(“In determining whether a law is facially invalid, we must be careful not to go beyond the
statute’s facial requirements and speculate about ‘hypothetical’ or ‘imaginary’ cases.”).
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outcomes were to emerge, an as-applied challenge could be brought then and
would not be prejudiced by the holding of the instant case.94
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION:
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING
The Ninth Circuit rightly applied existing law in reaching its decision in
Chicanos Por La Causa. After hearing arguments in the case, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment based on similar existing law.95
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have taken this opportunity to change
the law for the better by reversing Chicanos Por La Causa and overruling De
Canas. Such an outcome would have achieved two important goals: (1)
employers would have had a more uniform and predictable frame of reference
for their immigration questions, which would enhance compliance with the
law; and (2) the practical result of preventing state regulation of immigration
would have been to prevent the economic shocks that will ensue when
xenophobic state governments enact draconian immigration restrictions.
Because such restrictions will curtail the necessary flow of immigrants that the
modern American economy requires to avoid deleterious disruptions, both
public policy and purely legal considerations militated in favor of the Supreme
Court overturning De Canas. The remaining sections of this Note will first
explain why the Supreme Court’s ruling was the correct application of existing
law, and then why stare decisis should not have been applied in this case, but
rather why current precedents should have been overturned.
A.

The Supreme Court Correctly Concluded That the IRCA Does Not
Expressly Preempt the LAWA

There were two points at issue in the Supreme Court’s analysis of express
preemption: (1) whether there is any ambiguity in the IRCA’s term “licensing
law” such that a court could find the LAWA to be outside the term’s scope;96
and (2) whether there is support in the legislative intent and history for a
narrower reading of “licensing law.”97 The Court was correct in its analysis on
both points.
The IRCA’s use of the term “licensing law” definitely includes laws like
the LAWA. It is well established that when Congress does not define a
statutory term, the term should be given its ordinary or “dictionary” meaning.98
As the Ninth Circuit noted,99 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “licensing” as

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 861.
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1987 (2011).
Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1977–79.
Id. at 1979–81.
See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
Chicanos Por La Causa, 558 F.3d at 865.
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“[a] governmental body’s process of issuing a license.”100 Arizona law defines
a “license” as “any agency permit, certificate, approval, registration, charter or
similar form of authorization that is required by law and that is issued by any
agency for the purposes of operating a business in this state.”101 As the Court
noted, this definition tracks almost exactly the federal definition of a “license”
in the Administrative Procedures Act.102 By enforcing the LAWA through
suspension of a business license, Arizona brings the LAWA within the plain
sense of the term “licensing law.” When a statutory term is not ambiguous,
courts must give force to the plain meaning,103 so the Court was correct when it
held that the LAWA was within the scope of the IRCA’s savings clause.104
Even if the term “licensing law” were ambiguous, the presumption against
preemption in this case resolves the ambiguity in the LAWA’s favor. There is
a presumption against preempting laws concerning the states’ historic police
powers.105 De Canas makes clear that laws like the LAWA, which regulate the
employment of undocumented workers, lie within the states’ historic police
powers.106 The Medtronic presumption against preemption applies whenever
the states’ historic police powers are implicated.107 Even if federal laws now
regulate immigrant employment, historically the field belonged to the states, so
the Medtronic presumption still applies.108 Therefore, any ambiguity in the
term “licensing law” must be resolved in the LAWA’s favor. So the Ninth
Circuit’s final conclusion that the IRCA does not expressly preempt the
LAWA is certainly correct.
The appellants also argued that amendments to the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”) contained in the IRCA indicate
that Congress intended for the IRCA’s savings clause to allow state licensing
sanctions only after a federal IRCA adjudication.109 The Court quickly
disposed of this argument, simply noting the lack of warrant for this conclusion
in the IRCA text.110

100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1005 (9th ed. 2009).
101. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-211(9)(a) (Supp. 2010).
102. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1978 (2011).
103. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lamie v. U.S.
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004)).
104. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1981.
105. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
106. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976).
107. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
108. See, e.g., Lozano, 620 F.3d at 206–07.
109. Whiting, 131 U.S. at 1979.
110. Id.
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The Court Was Correct Not to Find the LAWA Preempted for Conflicts
with Federal Law

There are two types of implicit preemption: “field” and “conflict.” The
appellants did not offer a field preemption theory, so the Court dealt only with
conflict preemption arguments. By trying to bring a facial challenge before the
LAWA was ever implemented, the appellants argued conflict preemption from
a weak position. Conflict preemption cannot arise from merely hypothetical
conflicts.111 Therefore the appellants set themselves up for defeat by bringing
this case before any actual businesses could be sanctioned under the LAWA.
The Court could arguably have dismissed this part of the case as not yet ripe,
without ever reaching the conflict preemption argument.112 Regardless, the
Court considered two conflict preemption arguments and correctly rejected
them both.
The appellants’ broadest conflict argument was that Congress intended the
federal immigrant-employment scheme to be exclusive, so any state regulation
of that subject matter would necessarily conflict with congressional intent.113
More specifically, the appellants contended that an additional layer of state
penalties on top of the IRCA penalties would upset the congressional balance
of incentives.114
The appellants were able to cite many authorities for the proposition that
state laws conflict with federal law when they specify a penalty scheme that is
harsher than the federal scheme.115 The Court distinguished all of these cases,
however, on the grounds that they all concerned matters belonging to the
federal sphere of regulation, while the regulation of in-state business through
licensing laws was within the states’ historic police powers.116 Based on that
distinction and the express provision that the IRCA savings clause made for
state sanctions through licensing laws, the Court held that additional state

111. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982) (“The existence of a
hypothetical or potential conflict is insufficient to warrant the pre-emption of the state statute.”).
112. See, e.g., Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 812 (2003)
(enunciating the standard for dismissal on ripeness grounds, i.e., “that further factual development
would significantly advance our ability to deal with the legal issues presented” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
113. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1983.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing Am. Ins. Ass’n. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401, 405–06 (2003) (presidential
conduct of foreign policy); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74 (2000)
(foreign affairs power); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (2001)
(fraud on a federal agency); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 97, 99 (2000) (regulation of
maritime vessels); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 143–44 (1989)
(patent law)).
116. Id.
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penalties did not frustrate the IRCA’s intent.117 Moreover, the Court expressed
skepticism that the state penalties, as actually applied, would distort
congressional incentives to the extent that the appellants had predicted.118
The appellants’ narrower conflict argument was more interesting. The
IIRIRA made the use of E-verify optional and forbade the Secretary of
Homeland Security to make its use generally obligatory.119 The appellants
argued that, by obliging employers to use E-verify, the LAWA conflicted with
federal intent to make E-verify optional.120 The Court, cleaving strictly to the
IIRIRA text, noted that only federal officials, not states, are prevented from
mandating E-verify’s use.121 The appellants also argued that state E-verify
mandates conflicted with federal intent because increased demand on the Everify system would overwhelm its capacity.122 The Court set little store by
this argument because the federal government claimed that E-verify could
handle the increased demand and because Congress has repeatedly expanded
E-verify, indicating a desire to see it more widely used.123
C. The Law Would Be Clearer and More Consistent if De Canas Were
Reversed
Although the Chicanos Por La Causa court reached the correct conclusion
under then-current law, public policy concerns dictated that the Supreme Court
should have overturned De Canas by reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
Restrictions on the employment of immigrants are really immigration
restrictions, not employment restrictions, the holding of De Canas
notwithstanding. To hold otherwise is simply to ignore the reality that the
Supreme Court recognized in Hoffman Plastics—that the IRCA brought the
regulation of immigrants’ employment into the scope of a broader federal
scheme to control immigration.124 State immigration laws create unnecessary
confusion about the scope of federal authority and the standards for multi-state
business operations.
Arizona explicitly enacted the LAWA to discourage immigration,125 and
the employment regulations are just a mechanism to achieve this end. Arizona

117. Id. at 1984–85.
118. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1984–85.
119. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 402(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-656.
120. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1986.
123. Id.
124. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002).
125. See, e.g., Minutes of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 48th Ariz. Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(April 23, 2007) [hereinafter Minutes] (“Senator Huppenthal stated . . . ‘When I go to
neighborhoods . . . the impact of illegal immigration has caused them to look like they have been
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and other states are trying to make an end run around the Constitution’s
commitment of immigration to the federal authority, so it defeats the
constitutional intent to regard these state laws as employment regulations
within the historic police powers.
The United States’ nationally integrated economy needs a single, national
immigration regime, not fifty conflicting regimes.126 A principal objection
against the IRCA when it was first proposed was that it would impose
awkward burdens on American businesses, and Congress responded to these
objections by deliberately making that regulatory burden as light as
practical.127 Congress required the President to compile annual reports
detailing, among other things, the IRCA’s effects on the nation’s economy.128
Congress wanted to make the verification process easy for employers to
encourage voluntary compliance.129 The LAWA diminishes such ease of
application by adding another layer of regulation to which businesses must
attend.
Numerous federal courts have repeatedly declared the “paramount”
importance of the immigration law’s uniformity.130 Congress directed that the
IRCA’s application be “uniform.”131 This stress on uniformity reflects the fact
that federal control of immigration benefits the economy by keeping the
regulatory burden on American businesses to the minimum necessary to
control illegal immigration. Arizona courts’ applications of the LAWA are not
reviewable by the federal courts to ensure that Arizona’s approach to the
LAWA’s implementation remains in sync with the federal government’s
implementation of the IRCA.132 Therefore, the uniformity of immigration
enforcement will be disrupted by the Court’s decision to let the LAWA stand.
Moreover, the LAWA and laws like it rest in an uneasy tension with
Arizona clearly regards
dormant commerce clause133 jurisprudence.

hit with a nuclear bomb . . . . [I]t is just too much.’”); Napolitano Letter, supra note 42, at 3
(“Because of Congress’ failure to act, states like Arizona have no choice but to take strong action
to discourage the further flow of illegal immigration through our borders.”).
126. Actually, there are municipalities enacting their own immigration-related housing and
employment codes, so the number of applicable laws could be well more than fifty. See, e.g.,
Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2009).
127. Collins Food Int’l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1991).
128. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 403, 100 Stat.
3359, 3441.
129. Mazzoli, supra note 24, at 51.
130. Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008); Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d
1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004); Rosendo-Ramirez v. INS, 32 F.3d 1085, 1091 (7th Cir. 1994); BreaGarcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 693, 699 (3d Cir. 1976).
131. Immigration Reform and Control Act § 115, 100 Stat. at 3384.
132. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–19, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S.
Ct. 1968 (2011) (No. 09-115).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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undocumented immigrants as a public nuisance.134 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that states may not push nuisances onto other states.135 No
matter how harsh Arizona’s laws become, undocumented immigrants will still
try to enter the United States. Arizona is, in effect, foisting the costs of
undocumented immigration onto other states in violation of the dormant
commerce clause.
It might be argued that other states can deal with this by passing their own
restrictive laws, but this solution instigates a problematic “arms race” among
states to impose more restrictive laws on immigration than their neighbors.
This would upset the balance that Congress sought to strike between the need
for regulation and the desire to make such regulation as light as practicable.136
Moreover the federal courts have long recognized a close link between
immigration and foreign policy,137 so there is reason to worry that such an
“arms race” could touch off foreign policy difficulties for the United States.
This solution, therefore, will not solve the dormant commerce clause problem
without engendering Supremacy Clause138 and Article II problems.139
Finally, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the LAWA and laws like it
encourage the sort of racial and ethnic discrimination that the IRCA sought to
Under the IRCA, employers face the same sanctions for
avoid.140
discriminating against a documented worker based on race or ethnicity as they
face for hiring an undocumented worker.141 By contrast, the LAWA imposes a
potentially very harsh penalty (loss of business license) on employers who hire
undocumented workers,142 but discrimination against racial or ethnic minority

134. See, e.g., Minutes, supra note 125.
135. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 686 (1980) (“Iowa may not
shunt off its fair share of the burden of maintaining interstate truck routes, nor may it create
increased hazards on the highways of neighboring States in order to decrease the hazards on Iowa
highways.”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978) (“The New Jersey law
at issue in this case falls squarely within the area that the Commerce Clause puts off limits to state
regulation. . . . [because it is an] attempt by one State to isolate itself from a problem common to
many by erecting a barrier against the movement of interstate trade.”); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 173 (1941) (stating that no limit to the scope of state authority “is more certain than the
prohibition against attempts on the part of any single State to isolate itself from difficulties
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and property across its
borders”).
136. See supra text accompanying note 24.
137. See, e.g., Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Quinchia v. Att’y Gen., 552
F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]mmigration cases often involve complex public and foreign
policy concerns . . . .”).
138. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
139. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
140. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1990 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (2006), with id. § 1324b(g).
142. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212.01(F)(2) (Supp. 2010).
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job applicants merely opens the employer to civil liability.143 Imposing stiffer
penalties for hiring an undocumented worker than for ethnic profiling in hiring
incentivizes the employer to err on the side of discrimination.144 This is an
undesirable outcome from a public policy perspective.
D. Economic Considerations Favor De Canas’s Reversal
Immigration, including illegal immigration, generates a net fiscal gain to
the U.S. economy, so anti-immigration measures taken by individual states
have a deleterious impact on the nation’s fiscal health.145 According to a study
published by the National Academy of Sciences, even poorly educated, lowskill, undocumented immigrants and their U.S.-born descendants produce a net
contribution of $109,700 per immigrant to the public treasury over the long
term.146 Undocumented immigration may even be a net benefit to the states
that purport to be most burdened by it; the nineteen states with the highest
inflows of immigrants, the highest percentage of immigrants, and highest
resident immigrant populations also all had higher than average gross state
products, per capita personal incomes, per capita disposable incomes, and
median household incomes.147
Meanwhile, immigration enforcement is already expensive, and would
become even more so if states were allowed to force the federal government’s
hand on the issue.148 Those economists most critical of immigration have
calculated that low-skill immigrants consume $89.1 billion per year more in
government benefits than they pay in taxes, in essence costing American
Such
taxpayers approximately one trillion dollars over ten years.149
calculations ignore the full effects of immigration, however; by working for
lower wages, low-skill immigrants make goods and services in the United
States cheaper than they would otherwise be, thus increasing the buying power

143. Id. § 41-1463(B)(1).
144. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1990 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. See, e.g., Walter A. Ewing, The Economics of Necessity: Economic Report of the
President Underscores the Importance of Immigration, IMMIGR. POL’Y IN FOCUS, May 2005, at 5.
146. THE NEW AMERICANS, supra note 33, at 334. The figures in this report are given in
1996 dollars, so to calculate the $109,700 figure given above, I used the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Inflation Calculator, which is available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.
147. RICHARD NADLER, AMERICAS MAJORITY FOUNDATION, IMMIGRATION AND THE
WEALTH OF STATES 5–8 (2008). Arizona was one of these states.
148. See, e.g., RAJEEV GOYLE & DAVID A. JAEGER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS,
DEPORTING THE UNDOCUMENTED: A COST ASSESSMENT 3 (2005).
149. An Examination of Point Systems As A Method For Selecting Immigrants: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., and Int’l Law of H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 112 (2007) (statement of Robert Rector).
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of a working American’s wages.150 When these effects are considered in
calculating low-skill immigrants’ net economic impact, even immigration
skeptics calculate a net cost of only ten billion dollars per year.151 The United
States already spends more than this each year on border enforcement, so it
would not be cost effective to increase border enforcement.152 It would,
therefore, be detrimental to the nation’s fiscal health for states to enact
measures to discourage immigration or to force the federal government to
undertake more vigorous enforcement.153
Moreover, vigorous enforcement of LAWA-like laws would damage the
economy. If public authorities actually removed all undocumented workers
from the workforce, the American economy would suffer a shortfall of nearly
2,500,000 low-skill workers, resulting in a severe shock to its productive
capacities.154 While there are enough out-of-work Americans to make up that
loss, such a solution ignores the mismatch of skills between currentlyemployed undocumented workers and currently-unemployed Americans.155
Additionally, some Americans are unemployed for reasons (mental illness,
substance abuse, etc.) that would not be resolved by removing undocumented
immigrants from the workforce.
Increased immigration enforcement is neither cost effective, nor well
justified on other policy grounds. The most common anti-immigration
arguments have no substantial merit. As detailed above, over the long term
undocumented immigrants end up contributing more to the public treasury in
taxes than they receive in benefits.156 Despite claims that undocumented
immigrants take jobs from natives,157 economists agree that undocumented
workers are as likely to create jobs for native workers as they are to take jobs
from natives.158 Low-skill immigrants have little effect on the labor market

150. GORDON H. HANSON, THE ECONOMICS AND POLICY OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 8–9 (2009); Patricia Cortes, The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S.
Prices: Evidence from CPI Data, 116 J. POL. ECON. 381, 414 (2008).
151. HANSON, supra note 150, at 12.
152. Id.
153. Of course, by the same token, it is detrimental to the nation’s fiscal health for the U.S.
Congress to enact laws designed to discourage immigration, but the legality of federal laws is not
presently an issue before the Court. In any event, the fact that Congress has crafted some poor
public policies is no reason for states to upset the federal public policy balance by crafting even
worse ones.
154. See DAVID A. JAEGER, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, REPLACING THE
UNDOCUMENTED WORK FORCE 4 (2006).
155. Id. at 4–5.
156. THE NEW AMERICANS, supra note 33, at 334.
157. Lamar Smith et al., Reclaim 8 Million Jobs, THE DAILY CALLER (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:57
AM), http://dailycaller.com/2010/03/19/reclaim-8-million-jobs.
158. See, e.g., Joseph Altonji & David Card, The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market
Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH,
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outcomes for natives.159 While economists have historically disagreed about
the effects of undocumented immigration on wages of natives, the most recent
research on the subject indicates that low-skilled immigrants have no effect or
even a modest positive effect on the wages of natives in a variety of developed
nations including the United States.160 Despite claims of undocumented
immigrant criminality,161 undocumented immigrants are less likely than natives
to commit violent crimes.162 Indeed, heavy immigrant inflows correlate with
declining crime rates,163 and immigration may even be causing the decline.164
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit rightly applied existing law in its Chicanos Por La
Causa decision. The facts of this case are substantially similar to those of De
Canas. Although Congress has changed immigration law in the years since De
Canas, the holding is still ostensibly good law. The presumptions against
preemption laid down in De Canas and other cases militated against the

IMMIGRATION, TRADE, AND THE LABOR MARKET 201 (John M. Abowd & Richard B. Freeman
eds., 1991) (“The analysis of changes shows no effect of increased immigration on participation
or employment rates of less-skilled natives.”); David Card, Is the New Immigration Really So
Bad?, 115 Econ. J. F300, F321 (2005) (“New evidence from the 2000 Census reconfirms the
main lesson of earlier studies: although immigration has a strong effect on relative supplies of
different skill groups, local labour [sic] market outcomes of low skilled natives are not much
affected by these relative supply shocks.”); Heidi Shierholz, Immigration and Wages:
Methodological Advancements Confirm Modest Gains for Native Workers 2 (Econ. Policy Inst.,
EPI Briefing Paper No. 255, 2010), available at http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp255 (“In
the ongoing debate on immigration, there is broad agreement among academic economists that . .
. although new immigrant workers add to the labor supply, they also consume goods and services,
which creates more jobs.”). But see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ROLE OF
IMMIGRANTS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 22 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?
index=6853 (“A large number of studies have attempted to estimate the effects of immigration on
native workers, but their conclusions reveal little consensus.”).
159. Cortes, supra note 150, at 384.
160. Frédéric Docquier et al., The Wage Effects of Immigration and Emigration 13–14 (Trade
and Integration Team, Dev. Research Grp., Policy Research Working Paper No. 5556, 2011);
Cortes, supra note 150, at 414.
161. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 40, at 461.
162. RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT & WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., THE MYTH OF
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES
AMONG FOREIGN-BORN MEN 6 (2007) (“[T]he incarceration rate of native-born men in this [the
18–39 year] age group (3.5 percent) was 5 times higher than the incarceration rate of foreign-born
men (0.7 percent).”); John Hagan & Alberto Palloni, Sociological Criminology and the
Mythology of Hispanic Immigration and Crime, 46 SOC. PROBS. 617, 629 (1999); Matthew T.
Lee et al., Does Immigration Increase Homicide? Negative Evidence from Three Border Cities,
42 SOC. Q. 559, 571 (2001).
163. NADLER, supra note 147, at 9, 53.
164. Lesley Williams Reid et al., The Immigration-Crime Relationship: Evidence Across US
Metropolitan Areas, 34 SOC. SCI. RES. 757, 775 (2005).
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LAWA’s suppression, so the Ninth Circuit had no choice but to uphold the
Arizona statute.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court should have taken this chance to change
the law for the better by reversing the Ninth Circuit. To leave the LAWA in
place creates inconsistency in federal law and confusion about the respective
roles of states and the federal government in immigration and employment
law. Leaving the LAWA in place creates multiple levels of de facto
immigration courts, because actions brought under the LAWA and similar laws
in other states lie within the jurisdiction of state courts and beyond the review
of the federal court system. By allowing the LAWA to stand, the Supreme
Court has obliged American firms to contend with federal, state, and local
immigration laws, a complication that runs counter to the light regulatory
burden that Congress deliberately crafted in the IRCA.
Leaving the LAWA in place creates incentives for Arizona employers to
engage in ethnic profiling in hiring, an outcome that the IRCA was intended to
avoid. It also creates a curious and undesirable exception to the dormant
commerce clause prohibition against one state foisting problems onto another.
Finally, the ruling in favor of the LAWA will have deleterious economic
effects. For better or worse, the American economy requires the labor of many
undocumented immigrants, and successive presidential administrations have
tacitly (and sometimes explicitly165) admitted as much by assigning
comparatively few resources to workplace raids and other such employmentbased efforts to enforce immigration laws.166 Therefore, the proliferation of
LAWA-like laws will create undesirable disruptions in the American labor
market.
For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court should have taken this
opportunity to clarify the balance of power between the federal government
and the state governments with regard to immigration. By striking down the
LAWA, the Court would have eliminated the inconsistencies in federal law
wrought by De Canas and headed off the economic shocks that a rash of
LAWA-style laws will engender. The Court’s holding should have impinged
as little as necessary on the states’ historic police powers, but should
nevertheless have made clear that the federal government occupies the field of
regulations governing immigrant employment, such that that there is no room
for concurrent state regulations.
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